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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS LEE CURTIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Defendant,
and
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD,

Case No. 14354

Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a third-party action for contribution or
indemnity by Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (hereinafter called D&RG) against DeWayne Construction Company
(hereinafter called DeWayne) arising out of aji auto^trajji
collision.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor
of DeWayne dismissing the Third-Party Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
DeWayne seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
lower court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This lawsuit arises out of an accident that
occurred on October 21, 1973, in Salt Lake County, at
the crossing of 90th South Street by the D&RG Railroad,
At this time, a truck in which plaintiff was a passenger,
was struck by a train operated by the D&RG. (R. 1-5).
Plaintiff alleges that the D&RG was negligent in the operation of the train and crossing signals.

(R. 8-10, 13-14).

D&RG alleges and DeWayne admits at the time of the collision that the truck involved therein was owned by DeWayne
and was being operated by one of DeWayne1s employees in
the scope of his employment for DeWayne.
The plaintiff, a passenger in said truck, was at
the time of the accident also in the scope of his employment and has been paid workmen's compensation benefits by
DeWayne.
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The D&RG alleges that if plaintiff is entitled to
recover anything, DeWayne is liable to the D&RG for such
recovery under the theory of Respondeat Superior.
17).

(R. 16-

Accordingly, D&RG is seeking to recover in the

third-party action for contribution or indemnity.
The undisputed facts show that plaintiff has collected
the sum of $6,599.89 in workmen's compensation from DeWayne
Construction (R. 92-9 3) and that the driver of DeWayne's
truck was killed in the accident and that his representative has not been joined in this action.
The D&RG does not allege any formal, written indemnity agreement between it and DeWayne.
DeWayne finds no basis in the record £ Q £ any additional representations of the plaintiff or other witnesses
as outlined in Appellant's Statement of Facts and on that
ground, objects to them.
ARGUMENT
POINT I; THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT RELIEVES
DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY FROM ANY AND ALL
OTHER CIVIL LIABILITY TO THE PLAINTIFF OR TO THE
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD.
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer,
or officer, agent or employee—Occupational
disease excepted.—The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this
title for injuries sustained by an employee,
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whether resulting in death or not, shall
be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of
the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in
place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such
employee or to his spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of his employment,
and no action at law may be maintained against
an employer or against any officer, agent or
employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death or an employee. Nothing
in this section, however, shall prevent an
employee (or his dependents) from filing a
claim with the industrial commission of Utah
for compensation in those cases within the
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease
Disability Act, as amended, (emphasis added).
The foregoing statute makes it clear that payment of
workmen's compensation by DeWayne to an employee is in lieu
of all other civil liability of DeWayne to the plaintiff
or the D&RG.

The Workmen's Compensation Act makes it clear

that no action at common law in tort can be maintained
against DeWayne based upon any injury to the plaintiff.
DeWayne has made payments to plaintiff as prescribed
by the Workmen's Compensation Act in the sum of $6,599,89.
Section 35-1-60 is clear and unambiguous.

The payment of

workmen's compensation by DeWayne relieves it from any and
and all other civil liability whatsoever.

4
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The purpose of the Workmen*s Compensation Act has
been outlined by this Court in many cases.

In Cook v.

Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 U.2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963),
the Court stated:
. 0 . the philosophy behind the Workmenls
Compensation Act encompasses two main objectives. The first is to assure that an
employee who is injured in employment will
have necessary medical and hospital care
and modest but certain compensation for his
injury, with resulting benefits to himself,
his family and to society generally; the
other is to afford employers a measure of
protection against exorbitant claims for
injuries. . . .
*

*

*

. . . it permits employers to pay fees for
workmen's compensation insurance thereby
safeguard themselves against possible
disastrous claims for injuries which they
may not be able to bear. This allows employers to so plan and manage their affairs
as to make the wheels of industry run, with
its resulting benefits, including jobs for
employees. Both the giving of full effect
to the act, and doing justice to the employer, require that it be so interpreted
and applied as to afford the employer the
intended protection as well as conferring
the advantages it does upon the employee.
(emphasis added).
In this case, the D&RG is seeking to make an additional recovery from DeWayne of any sum it may be required
to pay plaintiff.

Such a demand violates not only the ex-

press terms of the Act but the spirit and philosophy upon
which the Workmen's Compensation Act is based.

5
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DeWayne was required to pay compensation for injuries to the plaintiff without showing of any fault.

It

is entitled to have the Workmen's Compensation Act applied
even-handedly and to have its liability limited by the
Workmen?s Compensation Act.
POINT II; AS THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD AND DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY HAVE
NO COMMON LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFF, CONTRIBUTION
IS NOT RECOVERABLE.
On the date of the accident, Section 78-27-39, Utah
Code Annotated, was in effect.

This statute provides;

78-27-39. Contribution among joint tortfeasors—Discharge of common liability by
joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The
right of contribution shall exist among
joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor
shall not be entitled to a money judgment
for contribution until he has, by payment,
discharged the common liability or more
than his prorata share thereof, (emphasis added)
Section 78-27-40(3) provides:
(3) As used in this section, "joint tortfeasor" means one of two or more persons,
jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to person or property, whether
or not judgment has been recovered against
all or some of them.
The D&RG and DeWayne have no common liability to the
plaintiff.

DeWayne's liability is established by the

Workmen's Compensation Act; the D&RG's liability will be
in tort, if any, outside the Workmen's Compensation Act.
DeWayne has paid workmen's compensation to plaintiff and
cannot be liable again for any sum whatsoever.
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As the D&RG and DeWayne have no common liability,
there is no right of contribution.

As defined, they are

not joint tort-feasors.
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of
Wisconsin v. Griffin Construction Company, 280 S.W.2d 179,
53 A.L.R.2d 967 (Ky. 1955) is a leading case.

In this case,

an employee of the defendant employer was injured on the
job and received workmen's compensation benefits from his
employer.

The employer later sued a third party for in-

juries and made a recovery.

The third party sought con-

tribution against the employer.

In denying contribution,

the Kentucky Court said:
The decisive question on this phase of the
case is whether or not liability exists on
the ground of contribution between joint
tort-feasors. Here the plaintiff's claim
meets an insurmountable obstacle. Such
obstacle is that plaintiff and defendant
were not joint tort-feasors as to the employee or his representatives. . . .
The allegations of the petition are that
it was through the joint negligence of
the plaintiff and the defendant that the
latter's employee was killed. Admitting
joint negligence, it is clear there was
no joint liability.
The authorities
effect that the
is based upon a
injured party.

appear overwhelming to the
doctrine of contribution
common liability to the
...
*

*

*
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It is clear that the Workmen's Compensation
Act extinguishes the liability of the employer to the employee for negligence of
the former. See Davis v. Solomon, Ky 1955,
267 SW 2d 674. Plaintiff argues that the
employee's common law cause of action was
not extinguished but that his remedy was
suspended by the Act. This is simply a
play upon words. If the employee cannot
recover damages for negligence of the employer, there is no liability of the employer, and consequently there could be no
common liability with a third party. An
employer operating under the Act cannot be
a joint tort-feasor with a third party who
injures his employee. . . .
There is substantial authority to the effect
that an employer paying workmen's compensation may not be called upon by a third party
for contribution, even though the employer
was negligent, because the common liability
does not exist. . . . (At 975).
Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated, requires
common liability as a prerequisite to the maintenance of
an action for contribution.

DeWayne, through workmen's

compensation, has discharged any and all liability to
plaintiff.

The plaintiff cannot recover from DeWayne.

If the plaintiff cannot recover damages from DeWayne,
there is no liability on DeWayne's part and thus, no common
liability as required by the contribution statute.
The general rule is that an employer whose concurring negligence contributed to injure an employee
cannot be sued for contribution.
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Section 76.21, Larson, The Law of Workmengs
Compensation (1970), states:
The great majority of jurisdictions have
held that the employer whose concurring
negligence contributed to the employee's
injury cannot be sued or joined by the
third-party as a joint tort-feasor,
whether under contribution statutes or
at common law. The ground is a simple
one: the employer is not jointly liable
to the employee in tort; therefore he
cannot be a joint tort-feasor. The liability that rests upon the employer is an
absolute liability irrespective of negligence, and this is the only kind of liability that can devolve upon him whether
he is negligent or not. The claim of the
employee against the employer is solely for
statutory benefit; his claim against the
third person is for damages. The two are
different in kind and cannot resolve in a
common liability. .
In a similar case, Beal v. Southern Union Gas
Company, 304 P.2d 566, 62 N.M. 38 (1956), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico sustained the dismissal of a thirdparty action for contribution.

In this case two em-

ployees of Clyde Coe were injured while installing sewer
lines in the City of Albuquerque.

Each received workmen's

compensation benefits from his employer.

The employers

later filed separate suits against Southern Union Gas
alleging negligence on its part in permitting dangerous
quantities of gas to accumulate and escape causing the
explosion that injured them.

Thereafter, the Gas Company
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brought a third-party complaint against Clyde Coe for contribution.

The New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act is

restrictive like the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and
provides that an employer who is covered by the Act cannot
be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death
or personal injury of any employee except as provided in
the Act; it further provides that such employer shall not
be liable to the employee or any other person as a result
of the injury.

In affirming the dismissal, the Court said:

Our tortfeasors' contribution act is
applicable only in instances where joint
tortfeasors share a common liability. . . .
The limitation of employer's liability for
injuries sustained by an employee covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Act covers
all instances where that injury is sought
to be made the basis for further and additional liability by the employee or others
in his behalf, and indirect liability for
such injury is also foreclosed both by the
terms of the act and because the employer's
liability for such injury is not in tort.
The authorities relied upon by appellant
are distinguishable as arising under less
restrictive limitation provisions or involving some relationship between the
third party and the employer independent of
joint negligence. Insofar as they may
declare a contrary rule, however, we will
not follow them.
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, like the New
Mexico Act, is explicit and definitive and makes it clear
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that only one shot can be had against an employer by
the employee or anyone else for injury to the employee•
In Pacheco v. Hilo Electric Light Company, Ltd.,
520 P.2d 62 (Ha. 1974), the Supreme Court of Hawaii
similarly dismissed a third-party complaint for contribution.

In this case, an employee sued a third party for

negligence and the third party sued the employer for contribution.

The Hawaiian Court said the employer, having

already made payment under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
was not subject to any further liability and stated that
the Workmen's Compensation Act totally and unequivocally
precluded any contribution being recovered from the employer.
As it is clear, the D&RG and DeWayne have no common
liability, they are not joint tort-feasors and contribution cannot be recovered by the D&RG.
POINT III; THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
BARS ALL CLAIMS OF THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD FOR INDEMNITY.
As appellant does not contend there is a written
contract of indemnity between DeWayne and it, appellant's
claim, if any, must arise on an implied contract of indemnity.

11
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In Royal Indemnity Company v. Southern California
Petroleum Corporation, 353 P.2d 358, 67 N.M. 137 (1960),
two workers were killed and one seriously injured in an
oil well fire.
suit.

The three actions were consolidated in one

B. J. Service Company, the employer of the three

men, made payment under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Royal Indemnity, the insurer of B. J. Service, filed suit
against Southern California Petroleum Corporation as
owner of the lease seeking recovery for sums paid by it
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Southern California

Petroleum filed a third-party complaint against B. J.
Service seeking indemnity on an implied agreement.

The

Court dismissed the third-party claims for indemnity.
The Court pointed out that New Mexico's Workmen's Compensation Act was definitive and restrictive, like the
Utah Act, and that it provided that any employer who is
covered by the Act shall not be subject to any other
liability whatsoever to any and all persons whomsoever.
The Court said that in the face of the language of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, an implied agreement to indemnify did not exist.

The Court said:

Whether or not a different rule might be
applied in a case where an employer and a
third party had specifically contracted for
indemnity, we need not here decide. Suffice
it to say that in this case, where reliance
is placed upon an implied agreement, we do
12
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not feel that the position of Southern
California can be sustained as against the
strong language of Section 59-10-5, supra.
If such an agreement to indemnify were to
be implied, the employer would be obligated
to pay damages to an injured employee,
through a third party, over and above the
amount of compensation fixed by the Act,
and thus impose the very liability against
which the Act declared the employer should
be insulated. This does not appear to be
the legislative intention, and the court
will not by decision alter the plain, clear
language of the legislative enactment.
In Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Company, Inc., 519
P.2d 22, 10 Wash. App. 630 (1974), Montoya, an employee of
Collator Corporation, was injured while on the job. He received scheduled compensation under the Washington's
Industrial Insurance Act and then sued a third party for
negligence in his injuries.

The third party sued Collator

Corporation for indemnity.

In upholding the decision of

dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court of Washington

An indemnity will not exist in this state
in the face of the Industrial Insurance Act
in the absence of a contract between the indemnitor and indemnitee. Broxson v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 446 F.2d
628 (9th Cir. 1971); Tucci & Sons, Inc. v.
Carl T. Madsen, Inc., supra. The employer may
ignore the immunity of the Industrial Insurance
Act and indemnify the third party when the
parties have independently created such a
contractual right. It will not exist otherwise.
*

*
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The result must be the same under the
Washington act. The employer cannot be
burdened with possible liability as a
joint tort-feasor in the event of injury
to the employee. The absolute right of
recovery given to the workman under the
act regardless of his fault carries with
it a concomitant right to freedom from suit
for the employer regardless of fault. The
liability for fault being removed, it should
not be reimposed by an allegation of negligence against the employer coming from a
third party. The rationale behind the
Washington approach to industrial insurance
further dictates that the responsibility
of the employer cannot be imposed upon or
shared with the third person if the employee
elects to take under the act. It follows
that the liability of the third person as
a tort-feasor may not be placed on the
immune employer if the employee elects to
pursue a common law remedy under RCW
51.24.010.
Colorado is another state where there is a restrictive,
definitive Workmen's Compensation Act similar to Utah's. In
Hilzer v. MacDonald, 454 P.2d 928, 169 Colo. 230 (1969), the
Court said that where an employee has received workmen's
compensation, the party against whom he brings a thirdparty action has no right of indemnification from the employer and that there is no cause of action for implied indemnity.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed
because:

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

The Workmen's Compensation Act precludes any

further liability on behalf of DeWayne for injury arising
to its employee,
2.

The D&RG and DeWayne have no common liability

and are not joint tort-feasors.
3. An implied duty to indemnify does not exist in
view of the explicit, definitive wording of the Workmen's
Compensation Act precluding any further liability whatsoever against the employer.
DATED this

day of March, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

B

Y.
Raymond M. Berry
and

By
Kim R. Wilson
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 5 21-900 0
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent,
DeWayne Construction Company
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